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The Charade of US Ratification of International
Human Rights Treaties
Kenneth Roth*
It is sadly academic to ask whether international human rights law should trump
US domestic law. That is because, on the few occasions when the US government has
ratified a human rights treaty, it has done so in a way designed to preclude the treaty
from having any domestic effect. Washington pretends to join the international
human rights system, but it refuses to permit this system to improve the rights of US
citizens.
This approach reflects an attitude toward international human rights law of fear
and arrogance-fear that international standards might constrain the unfettered
latitude of the global superpower, and arrogance in the conviction that the United
States, with its long and proud history of domestic rights protections, has nothing to
learn on this subject from the rest of the world. As other governments increasingly see
through this short-sighted view of international human rights law, it weakens
America's voice as a principled defender of human rights around the world and
diminishes America's moral influence and stature.
The US government's approach to the ratification of international human rights
treaties is unique. Once the government signs a treaty, the pact is sent to Justice
Department lawyers who comb through it looking for any requirement that in their
view might be more protective of US citizens' rights than pre-existing US law. In each
case, a reservation, declaration, or understanding is drafted to negate the additional
rights protection. These qualifications are then submitted to the Senate as part of the
ratification package.'
* Executive Director, Human Rights Watch.
i.

This effort should be distinguished from the US government's parallel, legitimate effort to ensure

that the ratification process enhances US citizens' tights by identifying and entering reservations to
any treaty provision that might detract from pre-existing rights. For example, Article 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires prohibition of"[ajny propaganda for
war." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171,6 ILM 368 (1966). The
US ratification of the ICCPR appropriately contains a reservation rejecting any requirement that
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For example, Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") prohibits the imposition of the death penalty "for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age."2 To preserve the power to execute
such juvenile offenders, the US government insisted on a reservation effectively
negating this provision.3 In taking this extraordinary step, the United States ensured
its place with the mere handful of governments worldwide that persist in the barbaric
practice of executing offenders who were children when they committed their
crimes-such paragons of human rights virtue as Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen. 4 Indeed, this US reservation was particularly egregious because it
concerneda right-the right to life-from which the ICCPR precludes derogation.5
Similarly, the US government entered a reservation limiting the conduct
prohibited by the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Torture Convention"). The problem, from
the government's perspective, was that Article 16 of the convention precludes not only
"cruel and unusual punishments"-the prohibition contained in the Eighth
Amendment of the US Constitution-but also "degrading treatment." To avoid any
possibility of this provision being interpreted to impose a higher official standard of
conduct, the US government adopted a reservation stating that the Torture
Convention prohibits6 no more than the "cruel and unusual punishment" provision of
the US Constitution.
After this exercise of stripping human rights treaties of any protections that
might add to US law, the government takes out a sort of insurance policy against the
possibility that the Justice Department lawyers might have made a mistake. To ensure
that some new hidden right is not lurking in parts of the treaty for which no
reservation, declaration or understanding was entered, the US government, first

speech be restricted in a manner that violates the free speech provisions of the First Amendment of
the US Constitution.
2. ICCPR, Art 6(5) (cited in note 1).
3. The reservation reads: "The United States reserves the right, subject to its constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly
convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including
such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age." US Reservations,
Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 102d
Congress, 2d Sess in 138 Cong Rec S 4781 (Apr 2,1992).
4. Human Rights Watch, UnitedStates: A World Leader in ExecutingJuveniles (1995).
5. ICCPR, Art 4(2) (cited in note 1) (prohibiting derogation from, among others, Art 6). See also
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24, on reservations to the ICCPR, UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 6 para 10 (1994) (stating that a state has "a heavy onus to justif" a
reservation to a non-derogable provision).
6. US Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Amend No 3200-3203, 101st Cong, 2d Sess
(Oct 27, 1990), in 136 Cong Rec S 17486 (Oct 27, 1990).
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declares that the treaty is "not self-executing,"7 meaning that it has no force of law
without so-called implementing legislation. This step is not necessarily objectionable
in itself, since it ensures that new rights are endorsed by both houses of Congress
through the traditional legislative process, rather than through the unicameral
ratification process, which requires the consent of only the Senate. But then, the
government announces that implementing legislation is unnecessary because,
according to the Justice Department lawyers, all the rights for which reservations,
declarations or understandings were not registered are already protected by US law.
The result is that US citizens are left with no capacity to invoke the treaty in the
US courts. The non-self-executing declaration precludes stating a cause of action
under the treaty, and the lack of implementing legislation means that there is no
alternative route to assert a claim.
One other way that US citizens might have invoked their treaty rights would
have been by appealing to one of the United Nations ("UN") review committees
established by many human rights treaties. For example, the ICCPR creates the
Human Rights Committee-a group of independent experts elected by the states
party to the Covenant with the responsibility, among others, of hearing complaints
brought by people who believe their treaty rights have been violated. However,
complaints can be heard only against governments that have ratified the (first)
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which the US government has not done. Nor has it
consented to have individual complaints of rights violations heard by any of the other
treaty bodies.
Another possible way to give meaning to the ratification of human rights treaties
is to take seriously the periodic self-assessment-a report to the relevant treaty body
of experts-that is required of all participating states. But the US government has
treated these reports as little more than an opportunity for self-congratulation. Its
first report under the ICCPR, in July 1994, was a lengthy review of relevant US laws
with minimal reference to actual practices. Its first report under the Torture
Convention, in October 1999, was only slightly better. As of May 2000, the US
government is five years overdue in submitting what may be its most sensitive
report-its first report under the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination.8
This refusal to apply international human rights law to itself renders US
ratification of human rights treaties a purely cosmetic gesture. It allows the US

See, for example, Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting Four Treaties
Pertaining to Human Rights, 95th Cong,prepared by Warren Christopher, Department of State
(Feb 23, 1978), in Richard B. Lillich, ed, US Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties With or Without
Reservations 83 (Virginia 1981).
8. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000, <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k> (visited Sept 16,2000).
7.
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government to pretend to be part of the international human rights system, but in fact
it does nothing to enhance the rights of US citizens.
This approach suggests a view that human rights treaties should be embraced
only insofar as they codify existing US practice, not if they would compel any change
in US behavior. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to identify any US conduct that has
changed because of the government's supposed embrace of international human rights
standards. The only two ratification-induced changes that come to mind are the
government's establishment and enhancement of criminal and civil liability in the
United States for those responsible for torture and other severe mistreatment in other
countries, as required by the Torture Convention, and the outlawing of genocide, as
required by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide ("Genocide Convention").9
In February 2000, for the first time of which I am aware, the US government
vowed to change not only its laws but also its conduct because of a human rights
treaty-in this case a proposed treaty. At issue was the use of children under eighteen
years of age as soldiers-a severe problem that plagues an estimated 300,000 children
in conflicts around the world. A broad coalition sought to enact a prohibition against
such abuse of children by adding an optional protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. To the dismay of many, the US government at first opposed the
protocol because it wanted to continue recruiting youths immediately upon their
graduation from high school, whether or not they had turned eighteen. Indeed, quite
apart from rejecting the protocol, the US government blocked other governments
from adopting it for fear that its existence would make the United States look bad. It
sustained this position even though the United States is one of only two countries not
to have ratified the underlying Convention on the Rights of the Child (the other being
Somalia, which has no functioning government).
In January 2000, the US government agreed to a compromise. It would accept a
rule barring the deployment of children under eighteen in combat and the involuntary
9. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act, 18 USC §§1091-93 (1994) (creating crime of
genocide); 18 USC § 2340 et seq (1994) (extending US criminal jurisdiction to acts of torture
committed outside the United States); Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 USC § 1350 (1994)
(enhancing civil liability for acts of torture committed outside the United States), but note that
foreigners could already bring civil suits against torturers under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC
§ 1350 (1994). Unfortunately, the US government passed up its first opportunity to prosecute a
torturer under this new power. Ricardo Tomis Anderson, a major in Peru's Army Intelligence
Service whom the US State Department had identified as a torturer, was arrested upon US Justice
Department instructions in early March 2000, after he had flown to the United States to testify
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States.
US Department of State, 1997 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (1998); US Department of
State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2000). See also Human Rights Watch, Torture
and Political Persecutionin Peru (1997). However, under a strained and unsustainable interpretation of
diplomatic immunity, Acting Secretary of State Thomas Pickering ordered his release. See State
Dept. Helped PeruvianAccused of Torture Avoid Arrest, NY Times A7 (Mar 11, 2000).
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drafting of them. But the proponents of a child-soldiers ban were forced to allow
continued voluntary recruitment of children under eighteen. This was a problematic
compromise because in civil wars the line between voluntary and coerced recruitment
is often blurred. But if the US government ratifies the protocol as it has suggested it
will and then changes its military recruitment and deployment practices, it would at
least mark the first time that government behavior, rather than law, has changed
because of a human rights treaty. Whether this marks a new attitude toward
international human rights law remains to be seen, but its very rarity suggests how
entrenched the view is in Washington that the US government ordinarily should not
embrace international human rights law except insofar as it parallels existing US
practice.
Informing this view is the assumption that the United States has nothing to
learn from the rest of the world when it comes to human rights-that US human
rights protections are already state-of-the-art-and that improvement upon them is
either inconceivable or undesirable. The ratification process is treated not as an
opportunity to bring US conduct up to the level of international standards, but as a
legal exercise in "dumbing down' international standards to equate them with US
practice.
Such arrogance might be understandable if US human rights practice were
beyond reproach, but it is not. The United States certainly has much to boast about
when it comes to human rights. The fact that I can criticize the government in this
article without fear of an official "knock on the door" is one illustration of the many
rights and liberties that US citizens in fact enjoy. But many US citizens, particularly
those who are politically weak and disfavored, continue to suffer violation of their
rights. The arbitrary application of the death penalty, the lack of accountability for
police abuse or misconduct by prison officials, the racially discriminatory impact of
the war on drugs, and the lack of legal protection against discrimination for gays and
lesbians are among the serious human rights violations in the United States that
existing law does not adequately address.'0
The ratification process might have been considered an opportunity to examine
critically these deficiencies in US human rights practice and to commit the
government to improvements. It might have been seen as an opportunity to build a
backstop of international legal protection should constitutional or statutory
guarantees fail. Instead, this opportunity was squandered; ratification was treated as a

10.

See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Sbielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the
United States (1998); Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar:Sexual Abuse of Women in US State
Prisons (1996); Human Rights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice:Racial Disparitiesin the War on Drugs
(2000); Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide: Retaliation Against Women in Michigan State Prisons
(1998); Stacey L. Sobel, et al, Conduct Unbecoming. Sixth Annual Report on Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't
Pursue,Don't Harass(Servicemembers Legal Defense Network 2000).
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mere charade for external consumption, with no impact on these or any other human
rights problems in the United States.
The US government's attitude toward human rights treaties differs from its view
of other international accords. Washington routinely accepts changes in its conduct
when negotiating trade or security agreements-by, for example, lowering trade
barriers or reducing missile or bomb deployments. But when it comes to human rights
treaties, ratification will evidently be considered only if it is cost-free.
What lies behind this cynical treatment of international human rights law?
There are several possible answers, none of which speak well for Washington. One
possible explanation is isolationism-the determination not to sacrifice US
sovereignty to rule by "furiners." But international human rights law is hardly a step
toward global governance. Indeed, even if the US government were to declare human
rights treaties to be self-executing or enact implementing legislation, the effect would
simply be that alleged victims of human rights abuse in the United States would have
an opportunity to state a claim before a US judge.
Another possible explanation is a determination that the United States, with its
advanced system for protecting rights, has nothing to learn from other countries.
International standards invite consideration of how other governments protect
rights-a practice that is quite common among the courts of other countries. But why
bother if improvement on US democracy is inconceivablee
This "know-nothingism" does not stand up to scrutiny. For example, Article 6(1)
of the ICCPR prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life. Any honest assessment of
whether the death penalty as applied in the United States violates this standard would
benefit from considering the powerful and sophisticated arguments of the South
African Constitutional Court finding the death penalty in violation of South Africa's
new constitution.11 Why should the global marketplace of ideas, so vigorously upheld
by Washington in other contexts, be judged irrelevant when it comes to rights
protection?
Of course, a US litigant could present the South African coures rationale even
under current law as persuasive authority. But under existing US law, US judges are
unlikely to pay much attention to these precedents because they are given no formal
relevance to the interpretation of US rights protections. By contrast, a system in
which claims could be stated under the ICCPR would invite consideration of these
global precedents. A US judge might still decide not to follow a particular ruling by a
foreign court or UN committee, but the process would at least have been enriched by
his or her consideration of it.
Washington's cynical attitude toward international human rights law has begun
to weaken the US government's voice as an advocate for human rights around the
ii. See State v Makwanyane, 3 SA 391, Case no CCT/3/94 (1995).
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world. Increasingly at UN human rights gatherings, other governments privately
criticize Washington's "' la carte" approach to human rights. They see this approach
reflected not only in the US government's narrow formula for ratifying human rights
treaties but also in its refusal to join the recent treaty banning anti-personnel
landmines and its opposition to the treaty establishing the International Criminal
Court unless a mechanism can be found to exempt US citizens. For example, at the
March-April 2000 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, many
governments privately cited Washington's inconsistent interest in international
human rights standards to explain their lukewarm response to a US-sponsored
resolution criticizing China's deteriorating human rights record.
The US government should be concerned with its diminishing stature as a
standard-bearer for human rights. US influence is built not solely on its military and
economic power. At a time when US administrations seem preoccupied with avoiding
any American casualties, the projection of US military power is not easy. US
economic power, for its part, can engender as much resentment as influence. Much of
why people worldwide admire the United States is because of the moral example it
sets. That allure risks being tarnished if the US government is understood to believe
that international human rights standards are only for other people, not for US
citizens.
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